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ABSTRACT
The failure of post-Soviet Russia to integrate into the West became
evident with the 2014 Ukraine crisis, leading Moscow to accelerate
its declared “pivot to the East”. However, the increased dependence
on China carries its own risks, such as the danger of becoming
Beijing’s junior partner. For an erstwhile superpower that
continues to declare and prize its autonomy in international
affairs, this is a particularly unappealing prospect. Thus, it remains
to be seen whether a genuinely balanced partnership can exist
between both countries. This article uses insights from Adam
Watson’s pendulum theory to explore Russia’s post-2014 Eurasian
predicament. We argue that the rapid rightward swing of the
pendulum in the Euro-Atlantic order following the end of the Cold
War has proven indigestible for Moscow. The article then moves
to discuss the Sino-Russian relationship in the context of the
emerging Eurasian space. It concludes that the growing
disillusionment of Russian leaders with the West since the 2000s,
along with the normative convergence between Moscow and
Beijing, has led to a closer partnership between the two. Yet the
partnership is also riddled with a number of insecurities on
Moscow’s side that could undermine the long-term prospects for
cooperation between Russia and China.
KEYWORDS
Russia; China; Eurasia; world
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Introduction
Following its annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia began to accelerate its declared “pivot
to the East”. After nearly a quarter-century of failed attempts to produce a stable relation-
ship with the United States and the European Union, this was the clearest signal yet that
Russia would not – at least for the foreseeable future – become a part of the West. Trenin
claims that the onset of the Ukraine crisis “essentially took Russia out of the post-Cold War
international system” (Trenin, 2018b, pp. 20–2), which in turn raises questions about the
future shape of world order.
Up until 2014, Russia had been caught between two primary – and arguably contradic-
tory – goals. On the one hand, it wished to develop good relations with the West. On the
other, it sought to retain its links with post-Soviet states and, where these had been
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disrupted by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, restore them (Kotkin, 2016). In the wake
of the Ukraine crisis, however, Russia’s pivot away from the West was not embodied exclu-
sively in a desire to pursue deeper integration in the post-Soviet space. Rather, a new idea
was put forward – that of “Greater Eurasia” (Karaganov, 2016). The notion of integrating
the Eurasian supercontinent from Murmansk to Mumbai and from Minsk to Shanghai –
rather than the earlier “Lisbon to Vladivostok” formulation – places Russia in a resolutely
and evolving Eurasian environment, although this “Greater Eurasia” project is said to
remain open to EU participation in the future. China, too, has proposed its own vision for
pan-regional integration in Eurasia – the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – and it remains an
open question as to whether Moscow and Beijing’s respective conceptions of Eurasian
order can be reconciled, even though both sides have pledged to coordinate the BRI
with the development of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) (Sangar, 2017).
In this context, refusing to accept a role as Washington’s junior partner could simply
force Moscow into becoming Beijing’s junior partner instead. This would be true under
multiple scenarios: Friendly relations between the United States and China could defini-
tively and unambiguously turn Russia into a second-tier power, but open conflict
between Washington and Beijing could force Moscow to pick sides and thus relegate it
to junior-partner status (Kaczmarski, 2015). Thus, Russia faces the difficult task of balancing
between these two major power poles and finding a way to help build a “regional archi-
tecture to constrain the China–US rivalry” if it wishes to continue to be a major power in its
own right (Kaczmarski, 2015). It is not difficult to see why this is important – both politically
and psychologically – for a country that a mere three decades ago enjoyed the status of
global superpower.
Moscow’s supposed wariness of junior-partner status can likely, at least in part, be
attributed to the circumstances surrounding its engrained material and psychological
dependence upon the West in general and Europe more specifically. Viacheslav
Morozov has characterized Russia as a “subaltern empire”, the product of a modern
history that has generated Russia’s “simultaneous belonging to and exclusion from
Europe” (2015, p. 41). These two Russian characteristics – both subaltern vis-à-vis
Europe and yet a European empire at the same time – have resulted in an ambiguous iden-
tity. As Morozov puts it, “Russia has successfully colonized itself on behalf of Europe but
has been unable to assimilate” (2015, p. 11). This difficulty, already present in Russian dis-
course for much of modern history, has been exacerbated by the circumstances surround-
ing the end of the Cold War, during which the West’s goal was “Russia’s adaptation to the
stringencies of an existing order, not the creation of an expanded community”, thus
further entrenching Russia’s subaltern position (Sakwa, 2017, p. 18). This impasse ulti-
mately resulted in the onset of the 2014 Ukraine crisis and the beginning of Russia’s pro-
claimed attempts to give birth to a Eurasian order.
This article seeks to explain why Russia-West ties deteriorated over the opening
quarter-century of the post-Cold War era, as well as why Sino-Russian relations have
remained on largely solid footing throughout this period in spite of Russia’s relative
decline and China’s rise. It begins by using insights from English School theory, specifically
the concepts of international society and Adam Watson’s pendulum, to help understand
Russia’s post-2014 predicament in the broader Eurasian space. It then explores the conun-
drum Moscow has found itself in since 1991 in attempting to craft a durable and reliable
model for its relations with the West and with Eurasia. From there it moves to discuss the
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evolving Sino-Russian relationship and its main challenges, before looking at the potential
for more substantive normative agreement between the two countries.
Competing international societies
Perhaps the most developed concept put forward by the English School of international
relations is the notion of “international society”. Unlike international systems, which are
usually rooted in a more Hobbesian or Machiavellian logic, international societies rely –
at least to a degree – on a common identity or set of norms that “define the boundaries
of a social system”, thus conditioning states’ behaviour and laying the ground rules for
what constitutes legitimate action (Buzan, 2014, pp. 12–13). English School theorists
have indicated that the barrier for transition from international system to international
society is in fact quite low. Martin Wight noted that a system of states – in which actors
are strategically conscious of one another – usually does not come into being without
at least a degree of cultural unity among its members (1977, p. 33). Moreover, Adam
Watson, who conceived of international systems as pendula oscillating periodically
between lesser and greater degrees of centralization, contended that all groupings of
states that are more centralized or integrated than “absolute anarchy” – that is, featuring
only “limited degrees of involvement between neighbours” – can be thought of as inter-
national societies, which “always originate within the matrix of a dominant culture”
(although this notion has been challenged in recent scholarship; see, e.g. Dunne &
Reus-Smit, 2017) and where states are limited by impersonal pressures, rules and hegemo-
nial authority (Watson, 1997, pp. 118–119).
We will return to why Watson’s pendulum model is well suited to shed light on post-
Cold War Russian foreign policy below, but for now let us explain how it functions in
greater detail. The pendulum model outlines the degree of material and normative
influence held by the leading state in any international society. The further to the
right the pendulum swings, the greater degree of centralization. Multiple independen-
cies (a completely decentralized society) at the leftmost extreme is followed to the
right by hegemony, when a state becomes powerful enough to determine the foreign
policy orientations of other states, then dominion, where the hegemon is able to
influence the domestic affairs of these states, and then empire, when the borders divid-
ing international centre and periphery begin to become blurred (Watson, 1997, pp. 118–
120). The reason the pendulum metaphor is employed, albeit imperfectly, is that a swing
in one direction will, over time, ultimately give way to a swing in the opposite direction.
Counterbalancing coalitions that seek to diffuse hegemony will emerge to oppose any
state that threatens to become too powerful or influential. To quote Watson (1992,
pp. 131–132), “the most stable point along the curve is not some invariable formula,
but is the point of optimum mix of legitimacy and advantage, modified by the pull on
our pendulum away from the extremes”. Put differently, there must be both an
agreed-upon legitimacy (rooted in both coercion and consent) that serves the interests
of actors in the society, as well as a managed rapidity of the pendulum’s movement in
either direction. For instance, Napoleon’s conquests represented a swing of the pendu-
lum rightward toward centralization that was too rapid to be stable, resulting in a
diffused hegemony agreed at Vienna being born in the wake of his defeat (Watson,
1992, p. 233).
EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 3
When it comes to Russia’s position in the broader Eurasian supercontinent, then, the
question is not whether the country is a part of an international society, but rather how
normatively thin or thick that society is. Although today’s global international society
may be normatively thin, it is institutionally quite thick, and there exist global commit-
ments on issues ranging from development to climate change. There is an additional con-
sideration: As the world retreats from the unipolar moment of the 1990s, some scholars
have contended that what lies ahead is not a new world order per se but rather several
variably overlapping international orders, in addition to the (potentially evolving) global
system we have today (see, e.g. Flockhart, 2016). What must be considered, therefore, is
not the international society to which Russia belongs, but rather which international
societies.
For the purposes of this paper, we can identify two such societies, which we call the
Sino-Eurasian order and the Euro-Atlantic order. The idea of Europe has for centuries
been the main “Other” against which the idea and identity of Russia has been defined
(Neumann, 1995, p. 1), either by emulation or rejection of it or a combination of both
(Morozov, 2015, p. 41), Moscow’s interaction with international society has been strongly
contingent upon the state of its relationship with Western states – the power base, as it
were, of today’s international order (Cox, 2013, p. 115). Indeed, particularly in the post-
Cold War period, Russia’s foreign policy behaviour has frequently been shaped in response
to Western actions,1 in keeping with the notion of Russia’s subaltern status, as mentioned
above. The Euro-Atlantic order denoted here is a social one: It concerns Russia’s relation-
ship with Western states and is distinct from Euro-Atlantic political and security institutions
such as the EU and NATO.
The Sino-Eurasian order, for its part, is distinct from the concept of “Greater Eurasia”,
which has the potential to include the European Union over the long term. Rather, it is
rooted in the Sino-Russian relationship situated within the locus of an increasingly con-
scious Eurasian society. Importantly, it includes an understanding that Moscow’s ties
with other Asian polities – including Japan, South Korea and India – on high-level and
first-order issues are strongly influenced by Russia’s aims and concerns (1) vis-à-vis
China, particularly to diversify its diplomatic and investment partnerships in Asia and to
entrench multilateral mechanisms that secure its treatment as an equal, and (2) vis-à-vis
the West, to balance against supposed Western excesses through bilateral diplomatic
relationships or through institutions such as the BRICS. This is to say that, in effect,
Russia’s primary international orientation is determined by the state of its ties with both
the West and China, with its other diplomatic relationships playing a largely peripheral
if not epiphenomenal role.
An additional clarification is required, involving the precise meaning of the term order
when referring to the two orders to which Russia belongs. Unlike Hedley Bull’s character-
ization from The Anarchical Society that reduces international order to the forms of behav-
iour that maintain an international society, we use the definition from The Globalization of
International Society that allows for a much closer relationship between order and society.
As Dunne and Reus-Smit (2017, pp. 31, 33) put it:
A breakdown of international order is not merely a failure to realize the primary goals of the
society of states; it is a failure of the rules and institutions that constitute that society. (…)
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[R]ather than seeing declining sociability as a marker of systemic politics, we see conflict and
contestation as integral to any international social order.
This meshes quite well with Watson’s pendulum model, which makes room for the exist-
ence of contestation and understands that a rapid swing can represent a fundamental
threat to any sort of normative agreement within international society. The stability (or
lack thereof) in the Sino-Russian and Euro-Atlantic orders impacts that of global inter-
national society.2
Russia between east and west
After Vladimir Putin became president in 2000, one of his initial tasks was to establish long-
term relationships with each player in Eurasia, with the aim of addressing regional
dynamics, competing with other regional actors, and advancing Moscow’s short-term
situational objectives. However, Russian strategists ultimately concluded that the age of
alliances was over and thus Moscow’s ability to interact diplomatically and economically
with different countries, including its new (sometimes strategic) partners, would assist
Russia in sustaining its regional influence. At the same time, Russia’s post-Cold War experi-
ence and its deep-rooted ire with the West led to its increasingly assertive behaviour in
certain spheres, the so-called aggressive defensiveness in its foreign policy, and to
growing ties between Moscow and Beijing. According to Moscow, Russian interests
were not accounted for in deliberations with the West, as in the early 2000s, nor when
the president was the more liberal-leaning Dmitry Medvedev, who supported sanctions
against Iran and endorsed a no-fly zone over Libya. After 2012, the so-called Putin Doctrine
in foreign policy was moulded and Aleksander Nevsky’s famous dictum, “We must
strengthen the defence in the West, and look for friends in the East” became increasingly
relevant.
Moreover, following Putin’s return as president in 2012, Moscow articulated in greater
depth its “pivot to the East” policy. It had initially been developed in the mid-2000s as a
belated policy response to the East’s spectacular rise, although Russia’s desires to diversify
its diplomatic partnerships date back to the 1990s. Recent tensions between Russia and
the West over crises in Ukraine and the Middle East have encouraged Moscow’s pivot
to becomemore pronounced, intensifying Sino-Russian cooperation on an unprecedented
level. Moscow and Beijing have now signed many energy accords worth hundreds of bil-
lions in USD, although the significance of these deals is contested (Bolt & Cross, 2018). At a
meeting in Moscow on 8 May 2015, Putin and Xi agreed to integrate their two aforemen-
tioned projects: the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) – now known as the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) – and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).
Russia’s declared intention to pursue international integration according to a “Greater
Eurasia” paradigm places it in an intermediate position between the two aforementioned
orders for an extended amount of time, still discursively and normatively dependent on
the West (Morozov, 2015, pp. 103–134) but increasingly integrated with the East. It will
take years before the full impact and shape of the EEU and BRI become clear, meaning
that Moscow and Beijing’s respective, long-term international postures and capabilities
will remain difficult to ascertain for the time being, as each party’s relationship with
Western states will depend in part on the “success” or “failure” of these integration pro-
jects. Furthermore, this interim period will also feature a preoccupation of major global
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actors with their own domestic issues: China’s need to shift away from an export-based
economy toward one more rooted in domestic consumption, the European Union’s
plans to pursue eurozone reform and address the migrant crisis in institutional form,
and the United States’ newfound pursuit of protectionism against the background of an
increasingly partisan and dysfunctional political system. In short, the result of Russia’s
declared “pivot to the East” could take years to manifest itself fully. It could be that
Moscow is pursuing Eurasian integration merely as a means of strengthening its hand
in its relationship with Europe, with Russia’s ultimate desire remaining European inte-
gration albeit on terms more equal than a Brussels-centric order. Alternatively, historians
may look back on the Ukraine crisis as the moment when Russia definitively broke from
Europe and the West.
Russia’s very crafting of a “Greater Eurasia” vision following its failure to persuade
Ukraine to join the EEU represents an admission of weakness, as the plan relies upon
Chinese participation rather than being centred on a self-sufficient post-Soviet space
(Lukin, 2018). And as time goes by, the balance of power in Central Asia is likely to
favour China, for reasons ranging from Russia’s relative economic decline to China’s
increasing consumption of natural resources from and its growing activism in the
region (A. Gabuev, personal interview by author. Moscow, November 30, 2017). That
said, there are several mitigating factors that work against Moscow becoming Beijing’s
junior partner in global affairs, such as Russia continuing to enjoy an overwhelming pre-
eminence over China when it comes to nuclear weapons. Moreover, although many poss-
ible futures exist, a likely outcome of China’s political rise and increasing self-sufficiency is a
worsening of relations not only with countries in East, Southeast and South Asia, but also
with the United States itself (White, 2013). In such a scenario, China will need to maintain
good relations with Russia to avoid encirclement (D. Suslov, personal interview by author.
Moscow, September 11, 2017). Additionally, becoming China’s junior partner is a question
of degree. For example, it is difficult to imagine the process going so far as to result in a
situation where Russia, which thinks of itself as a great power in its own right, would reg-
ularly set aside its UN Security Council veto for China’s benefit (A. Gabuev, personal inter-
view by author. Moscow, November 30, 2017).
To be sure, Russia is open to Chinese leadership on certain political matters in Eurasia,
such as the North Korean issue (A. Kortunov, personal interview by author. Moscow, Sep-
tember 25, 2017). Moreover, while it does attempt to deepen ties with the likes of Tokyo
and ASEAN, Moscow has not mobilized overwhelmingly to hedge against China’s growing
influence in East Asia, thus representing a “gradual accommodation to China’s pre-emi-
nence” (Kaczmarski, 2015, p. 167). China’s predominance could appear less threatening
or overwhelming if Beijing is bound into some sort of Eurasian multilateral mechanism,
with the recent expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to include
India and Pakistan coming to mind, thus acting as a break on unbalanced bilateral relation-
ships in Eurasia that feature a powerful China and a less powerful counterpart (Trenin,
2017). Finally, it could be that Russia is less interested in its specific relative power vis-à-
vis China than it is in being recognized as a great power with legitimate interests and a
sphere of influence. This suggests that irritants in Sino-Russian relations could be dealt
with in a cooperative rather than an adversarial fashion. All of this implies that the
complex and multifaceted relationship between Moscow and Beijing is of a different
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nature to the former’s efforts to balance against the West (Korolev, 2016), which seemingly
denies the legitimacy of Russia’s interests and influence in Eastern Europe.
Moreover, Moscow has had more time to adjust to Beijing’s gradual rise than it had to
adapt to the Western pre-eminence that immediately emerged upon the Soviet Union’s
collapse. It may be convinced at this point that China “has limited aims and is a risk-
averse world power” due to the “self-restraint that it has exercised toward Russia at the
bilateral, regional and global levels (Kaczmarski, 2015, pp. 169–170). Indeed, when it
comes to Russia and China’s shared neighbourhood in Central Asia, Beijing “makes no
overt effort to question Russia’s role in the region, avoiding the zero-sum dynamics that
have led to numerous conflicts between Russia and the West and could otherwise
cause tension in the region” (Stronski & Ng, 2018). In other words, unlike in the Euro-Atlan-
tic order and despite China’s meteoric economic rise, the Sino-Eurasian order has not fea-
tured a rapid rightward swing of the pendulum on normative issues at Russia’s expense. To
use English School vernacular, Russia’s relationship with China has been marked by rela-
tive pendular stability, including the construction of multilateral, inclusive security mech-
anisms such as the SCO.
Of course, none of the above guarantees that Russia’s relations with China – particularly
in Central Asia – will not grow more complicated over time. These relations, however, are
clearly multifaceted, which speaks against the application of structural theories such as
neorealism to explain the forces that drive the Sino-Russian relationship. As noted, we con-
ceptualize Russia’s post-Cold War relationship with the international societies to which it
belongs as being dependent upon two vectors: the evolution of the Sino-Eurasian order
and the evolution of the Euro-Atlantic order. An agreed-upon legitimacy was lacking in
Moscow’s post-Cold War relationship with the Euro-Altantic order (Sakwa, 2017, pp. 11–
68), as that order underwent an overly rapid rightward pendulum swing as Washington
sought to consolidate a unipolar Atlanticist Europe that largely excluded Russia.
It is important that we clarify what is meant by “agreed-upon legitimacy” here: We refer
not only to the content in question but to the perceptions and expectations surrounding it.
Russia’s overwhelming material and normative dependence on the West, as noted above,
suggests that Moscow had more ambitious expectations for its post-Cold War relationship
with the West than it did initially for its ties with China. Indeed, in the early 1990s, in line
with Moscow’s support for the Western security agenda in Serbia and Iraq and its desire to
integrate into Western institutions (Tsygankov, 2013, p. 72), Russia went so far as to discuss
the possibility of having some form of NATO, UN or OSCE involvement in stabilizing those
areas of the former USSR where ethnic conflict had broken out. However, Moscow’s expec-
tations were met with disappointment. The initial trade-off expected by Gorbachev that
was to bring Cold War-era hostilities to an end – freedom of choice for Warsaw Pact
states in exchange for a promise of non-interference by the West in Russia’s internal
affairs – did not see Western states uphold their end of the bargain. Moreover, to many
Russians the West appeared more interested in weakening Russia and causing the com-
munist economic system to collapse than it was in helping it to establish a veritable
rule-of-law system and social safety net (Tsygankov, 2013, p. 121).
To summarize, the amount of content Russia shared with the Euro-Atlantic order was
thick – rooted in profound desires related to identity and regional architecture – but agree-
ment on that content was thin. Russia wished to “return to Europe” after having been cut
off by the Iron Curtain and expressed its will to join the West through the creation of a new
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“Greater Europe”, but ultimately was unable to find a partner that could fully accommo-
date its desires (Sakwa, 2017, p. 18). By contrast, although Moscow and Beijing do not
have identical national interests, Russia’s relationship with and expectations from the
Sino-Eurasian order were thin, but there has thus far proven to be a sufficient amount
of agreement concerning the relevant content, including (at least nominal) respect for
Russia’s supposedly legitimate great-power aspirations and sphere of influence.
Whether this will remain the case as Russia’s decline progresses and China’s rise continues
remains an open question, but already we can draw one conclusion: Normatively thin
orders are not necessarily unstable, so long as they are properly managed. In the case
of Russia’s relationship with the Euro-Atlantic order, however, diverging expectations
and norms combined with an overly hasty rightward pendulum shift to produce an
even greater (and unstable) normative divide between Russia and the West.
This model allows for the fact that Russia–China relations are now mature enough not
to be entirely dependent upon the West, while at the same time noting that Moscow’s
supposed wariness of Beijing can be mitigated if the latter adopts a restrained approach
toward the former. It also allows us to conclude that Russia, most of whose population is in
Europe, will remain open to resuming a Western-oriented predisposition in the future if it
perceives the threat level emanating from the West as low.
Russia’s influence in Eurasia
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 raised the dilemma for policymakers in
Moscow of how to give proper form and meaning to its new relationship with the heart-
lands of the former tsarist and Soviet empires. Many of the territories that had been an
integral part of Russia in its different guises had practically overnight become independent
countries. The way that ties with the former empire were to be given shape was intricately
connected to Russia’s international orientation and self-conception. The main goal of the
new Russian elite was to transform the country into a free-market democracy, and it was
only by developing partnerships with more economically and politically “advanced”
Western states such as the US, Germany and France that Russia could succeed in this tran-
sition. This would take priority over Moscow’s relationships with the ex-Soviet republics, a
strategy reinforced by the argument that Russia’s imperial burden was holding back its
development. In the event, this period of almost unconditional pro-Westernism proved
short-lived, initially owing to a period of sustained economic turbulence and disorder pla-
guing the former Soviet republics on Russia’s periphery (Kuchins & Zevelev, 2012, pp. 199–
200). This paved the way for renewed attention toward the post-Soviet space, especially
under the leadership of Foreign Minister and later Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov,
who championed the concept of a multipolar world with Russia constituting one of its
poles.
The rise of Vladimir Putin to power in 1999 did not solve Moscow’s conundrum con-
cerning the nature of its relationship with the West, despite his designation of relations
with Europe and the US as a priority at the start of his first term. The failure to grasp
this opportunity and establish a genuine and productive partnership can arguably be
blamed on the short-sightedness of Western chancelleries. A host of actions by the US,
including its 2002 withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, its invasion of Iraq in 2003, and its
alleged support for so-called “colour revolutions” across the post-Soviet space left
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Russian leaders disappointed and deeply cynical vis-à-vis the West. The result has been a
more assertive course set by Moscow, buoyed by high oil prices, and the renewed impor-
tance of the post-Soviet region for Russian policymakers. This was given institutional shape
through the project of Eurasian integration, embodied in the Eurasian Economic Commu-
nity and later Union (EEU). Moscow’s official line is that the EEU would function as a step-
ping stone for an “integration of integrations”, making possible the “Greater Europe” that
Gorbachev had striven for. A more cynical view is that the EEU was simply designed to
provide an instrument through which Moscow could carve out a sphere of influence for
itself in its “near abroad”. Indeed, Moscow’s newfound assertiveness has been
accompanied by a not always benign reassertion of what Dmitry Medvedev called
Russia’s “sphere of privileged interests” (Kremlin, 2008), evidenced by heavy-handed
tactics such as trade wars and embargoes as well as, in Georgia’s case, outright military
conflict.
Following the continued rise in Russia-West tensions in 2011–12 over Libya and pro-
tests in Moscow, the eruption of the Ukraine crisis in 2014 marked a definitive end to
Russia’s persistent dilemma of crafting a coherent foreign policy toward the West. As
Trenin asserts, it “served as the coup de grâce for the two concepts that had guided
Russian foreign policy since the break-up of the Soviet Union: integration into the wider
West and reintegration of the former republics with Russia” (Trenin, 2017). As is well
known, the revolution in Kyiv that would eventually lead to the toppling of President
Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014 was prompted by his last-minute rejection of
Ukraine’s proposed Association Agreement with the EU, which was done at Moscow’s
behest. From the Kremlin’s perspective, the expansion of EU influence and the admission
of new NATO members had often gone hand in hand throughout the 1990s and 2000s
(Mearsheimer, 2014). Now it was time for Moscow to push back.
At the same time, the annexation of Crimea and the ensuing proxy war in eastern
Ukraine made hitherto loyal Russian allies such as Belarus and Kazakhstan more apprehen-
sive, in addition to completely estranging the new rulers in Kyiv. Accordingly, the goal of
“small” Eurasian integration – that is, solely amongst Soviet successor states – took a fatal
hit as Ukraine would not sign up to the EEU, while other member states sought to curb the
supranational tendencies of the project and its overall competences for fear of surrender-
ing their sovereignty to Moscow. As the first deputy prime minister of Kazakhstan said
upon signing the treaty in May 2014, “We are not creating a political organization; we
are forming a purely economic union (…) we don’t meddle in what Russia does domesti-
cally, and they cannot tell us what foreign policy to pursue” (cited in MacFarquhar, 2014).
Ironically, the supranational features of the EEU were precisely meant to keep Russian
power in check by an extensive rules-based set of mechanisms, thereby acting as a reas-
surance for the union’s smaller members (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2017). This conundrum,
born out of apprehension over Russian domination, is perhaps the most important chal-
lenge to the overall viability of the project.
With the viability of the EEU in question and the prospects for a “Greater Europe” –
let alone a “Greater West” – in tatters, Russian leaders turned to the idea of a Greater Eur-
asian Partnership, spanning not just the post-Soviet region but also Turkey, Iran, South Asia
and East Asia. The new approach is not so much a “pivot to the East”, as both Kremlin
pundits and Western commentators have argued (Karaganov, 2016; Lo & Hill, 2013), but
can rather be interpreted as a new construct in which Russia situates itself at the core
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of an entity encompassing the entire Eurasian supercontinent. Sakwa calls this “biconti-
nentalism”, a geopolitical approach in which Moscow enjoys an advantage from its geo-
graphic location by playing off “‘Western’ against ‘Eastern’ orientations” (2015b, pp. 65–
69). Thus, bicontinentalism in Sakwa’s vocabulary is not only a geographical term but
also a foreign policy strategy that grants Moscow freedom of manoeuvre. In this
context, the EEU remains a site of priority, notably in view of linking up with China’s BRI
(Luzyanin, 2018). However, the new Eurasian vision is also underpinned by the SCO,
which since 2017 counts India and Pakistan as its members, thereby spanning most
corners of the Eurasian landmass.
Although Russia intended to re-emerge as a significant political and economic player in
Eurasia, its influence has in fact declined since 1991. A factor that confirms a major contra-
diction in the study of Russian foreign policy since 2001 is that while Moscow executes a
very astute foreign policy with its limited resources and capabilities, playing an important
role in various global and regional conflicts, its influence and presence in the regions tra-
ditionally viewed as Russia’s “privileged sphere of interests” continues to decline. As noted
in the previous section, Moscow now shares Central Asia with Beijing. But beyond this, the
influence of mere regional powers such as Iran in many ways exceeds that of Russia in
places where Moscow once reigned supreme, such as Afghanistan, Iraq and to a certain
extent even Syria. Russia is incapable of seizing the leading reins in many key regions in
the Eurasian core.
Forms of international legitimating principles and rising normative
agreement between Moscow and Beijing
It is important to note that when Putin first assumed the Russian presidency, his main pri-
orities with regards to relations with China were to continue and enhance normalization,
rather than establish or strengthen any strategic alliance. Unlike Primakov, Putin seemed
uninterested in creating a strategic “axis” between Russia and China to balance against the
US and the rest of the West (Tsygankov, 2009, p. 10). In the wake of the terrorist attacks of
11 September 2001, the idea of multipolarity was abandoned, instead focusing on “prag-
matism and self-concentration” in the international arena (Tsygankov, 2010, p. 134). Putin’s
initial National Security Concept placed emphasis on issues such as terrorism, separatism,
corruption and organized crime instead of multipolarity. To the astonishment of China’s
political elite, Putin gave preference to partnership with the West over the East. As Shevt-
sova and Shakleina report, when he came to power, Putin was open to the influence of and
even sought contacts with Western states (Shevtsova, 2010, pp. 47–52), trying once again
to “reach out to the West” (Shakleina, 2012, p. 164). Just as Boris Yeltsin and his foreign
minister Andrei Kozyrev had done nearly a decade earlier, Putin hoped for a full partner-
ship with the Western world which would secure Russia’s modernization and integration
into the Western economic institutions (Shevtsova, 2010, pp. 47–52).
However, by the mid-2000s, Putin’s Russia became disillusioned with the West and Sta-
tists and Sinophiles in the government began to advocate for an alliance with China, pro-
posing to use the SCO as “a geopolitical counterweight to NATO” (Trenin, 2012, p. 4). It is in
this context that the improving post-Cold War relationship between Moscow and Beijing
should be understood: resting on a set of normative issues, including opposition to
Western – and particularly American – hegemony in international arena and the protection
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of non-Western states’ sovereignty including “the independence of national interests and
the diversity of political systems” (Kim & Indeo, 2013, p. 276). Both countries are also scep-
tical about the views held by democratic universalists and uphold traditional interpret-
ations of national sovereignty and non-interference in other countries internal affairs.
Officials in both Moscow and Beijing were very critical of George W. Bush’s interventionist
“Freedom Agenda”, aggressively promoted in 2000s by his administration worldwide. The
two countries’ officials have on many occasions stated that Bush’s “War on Terror” has
failed, while the invasion of Iraq has actually increased the worldwide threat of terrorism.
Furthermore, the Russian and Chinese leaderships believe that American policies pro-
duced “colour revolutions” in countries such as Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and twice in
Ukraine (Weitz, 2008, p. 37). Russia and China have come to doubt the genuine neutrality
of many international bodies, which they consider as “United States-centred” (Rozman,
2014, p. 245). The political establishments of both countries are extremely critical of the
West’s use of NGOs to interfere in sovereign countries’ internal affairs.
The two countries’ political elites are sceptical of the possibility of transforming author-
itarian states into functioning democracies and fail to understand how overthrowing a dic-
tator necessarily leads to the emergence of democracy, as had seemingly been promoted
by many Western democratic determinists and neoconservatives in the 1990s and 2000s.
The Western intervention in Libya, according to Sakwa, was one of the main reasons attrib-
uted to Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012, as it confirmed Russia’s suspicions regard-
ing Western intentions in the Middle East (Sakwa, 2015a, p. 572). On 17 March 2011,
following a UN Security council vote, NATO established a no-fly zone over Libya.
Russia’s political establishment believes that Western states once again tricked Russia
by calling for Medvedev to abstain from voting on the famous UN Security Council Resol-
ution 1973. The resolution authorized a no-fly zone over Libya which later developed into a
full-scale bombing campaign targeting the country’s infrastructure and enabling the over-
throw of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi (Kremlin, 2011). Hillary Clinton’s psycho-ecstatic
laugh when watching Gaddafi being tortured and killed, exclaiming, “We came, we saw, he
died,” caused a huge debate in Russian society, with commentators accusing Medvedev of
betraying Libya and its people (Odnako, 2013; RT, 2016).
Following these events, Russia’s “turn to the East” policy, originally announced in 2010,
became “more pronounced” and transformed the Sino-Russian relationship into a “closer
partnership that included cooperation on energy trade, infrastructure development, and
defence” (Trenin, 2015). Both Russia and China had been critical of the American response
to the onset of the so-called Arab Spring. But Washington’s behaviour during the Ukraine
crisis, where the perception was that US officials participated in a coup d’état against an
extremely corrupt but democratically elected president, was the last straw, pushing
Moscow and Beijing even further toward consolidating their “strategic partnership”. This
perception may have been rooted in paranoia, the result of Russia failing to devise a strat-
egy for dealing with its former imperial possessions – and Ukraine in particular – that is
workable in the post-Soviet context (Trenin, 2018a). But as mentioned above, perceptions
and expectations are crucial. Moscow’s belief in its right to a sphere of influence and its
wariness of NATO’s eastward encroachment have been guiding principles of Russian
foreign policy for much – if not all – of the post-Cold War period. Its expectation that
the West would be understanding of its needs and desires, precisely when its normative
dependence on the West was at its apex following its “return to Europe” at the end of the
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Cold War, ultimately produced a volatile relationship when it appeared as if those needs
and desires were being disregarded. A perceived attempt to strengthen Atlanticist hege-
mony in the European neighbourhood – a rightward swing of the pendulum – encouraged
Russia to push back and send the pendulum leftward. Not all, however, is rosy in Russia’s
relationship with China, as the next section will show.
Sino-Russia relations in an evolving Eurasia
Several key concerns have been invoked in Russia’s China discourse since 1991. They
include: (1) Russia becoming China’s raw material appendage; (2) the disappearance of
Central Asia from Russia’s sphere of privileged interests; (3) transformation into China’s
“junior partner”; and (4) the perceived Chinese takeover of the Russian Far East due to
the influx of Chinese workers and China’s increased presence there. Interestingly, the
“China threat”was present in Russia’s public and official discourse until 2012, when, in con-
junction with Moscow’s emphasis on its “pivot to the East”, official Russian discourse
began to treat the idea of a “China threat” as taboo (Kuhrt, 2016).
The evident disparity in power certainly increases the risk of Russia becoming a “junior
partner in a Beijing-led coalition” (Tsygankov, 2009, p. 17). Globally, the Chinese defence
budget is second only to the US, with Beijing planning to acquire three aircraft carries, for
instance, while Russia is ranked fifth with only one such operational carrier. In the 1980s,
the GDP of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (the Russian titular republic
within the USSR) was 60 per cent larger than that of China, whereas by 2010 post-
Soviet Russia’s economy was four times smaller than China’s (Trenin, 2012, p. 8). While
Beijing plays a very important role in Moscow’s international trading partnerships,
China’s most important trading partner is the US, with Russia occupying a marginal
place (Spanger, 2016). The trade structure is a clear indication that Russia’s concerns
about morphing into China’s raw material appendage are not entirely groundless. In
1999, for instance, Russia’s Chinese imports were diverse, consisting of processed and
unprocessed goods such as metals, plastic, textiles, footwear and machinery. By 2015
more than half of Chinese exports to Russia were hi-tech and machinery. In 1990, only
six percent of Russia’s exports were hydrocarbons and raw materials, while 39 per cent
were machinery. By contrast, by 2013 a staggering 74 per cent of Russia’s exports were
hydrocarbons and raw materials (e.g. gas, oil and timber), with only 4 per cent being
machinery and processed goods (Spanger, 2016). In short, Russia appears to be turning
into “an oil well”, where China simply takes its raw oil and gas.
In this context, Russia’s political elite has indeed grasped that China’s colossal Belt and
Road project is not only about building roads from China to Europe, particularly as Beijing
is anticipated to continue to rely on existing and more trustworthy and economically
viable shipping methods. China’s grand vision is rather about the emergence of a
dynamic and promising economic space in which Beijing finds itself as the centre of pros-
perity and growth. Many critics maintain that China’s main interest in Russia is due to its
geographic location, in which Russia is considered as a source of rawmaterials, a card to be
played against the West, and a road to transport Chinese goods to Europe. This notion of
Russia acting as Beijing’s catalyst to achieve its global ambitions is prevalent in popular
Russian discourse. For example, the celebrated novelist Vladimir Sorokin has written dys-
topian novel in which Russia emerges as a road from Guangzhou to Paris. In the book, the
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road embodies the country’s arteries and veins, bruised by crimes and horrors (Sorokin,
2006, p. 46). Meanwhile, Russian strategists and the Kremlin-loyal political elite prefer to
pretend that China’s Belt and Road addresses another integration project – in that it
could be integrated with the EEU – rather than admit that it asserts Chinese hegemony
in Eurasia and ultimately represents an attempt to construct a Sino-centric regional
order. Sergei Karaganov (2016) suggests it was the Russian diplomat Igor Morgulov who
proposed the idea of linking the EEU with the BRI. The initiative to coordinate the two
appears to be a move by Moscow to mask yet another concession to China and appear
as one of Eurasia’s key players instead of China’s junior partner, while strategists stall for
time so as to examine ways to curb China’s seemingly unstoppable rise in Eurasia.
Russia has thus far managed to establish a tacit if somewhat facile agreement with
China in which Beijing recognizes Russia’s regional interests – or at least pretends to do
so. Indeed, Moscow’s political technologists have been successful in shaping a narrative
where Russia and China are strategic partners, with both being major and equal players
in Eurasia, proposing to link their respective integration projects and calling it a form of
sopriazhenie.3 China has reciprocated, is playing along with Russian pretences, and is
likely to continue to do so as long as this suits its interests. To the Russian public,
Moscow consequently appears as a key player in Eurasia, one equal to Beijing instead
of in the role of “junior partner”. In the meantime, Russia has managed to gain the time
the Kremlin desperately needs to find ways to address China’s rise in Eurasia and
explore the means necessary to adjust itself to the new realities of twenty-first century
Eurasia.
Russia’s future foreign policy vectors
The rupture in Russia-West relations brought on by the Ukraine crisis is a fundamental and
systemic one, rooted in opposing conceptions of order for both Europe and the world. The
crisis also revealed the fact that both Russia and the West have pursued contradictory
foreign policy aims over the past quarter-century. Russia cannot pursue good relations
with the West while at the same time trying to dominate its backyard, as the latter violates
the principle of the “right to choose” one’s foreign policy orientation that Western states
believe applies to all European countries, as per the Paris Charter (Paikin, Merlen, & Ivan-
chenko, 2018). Washington and Brussels, for their part, made the mistake of undertaking
the expansion of NATO while simultaneously telling the Kremlin that this process was not
directed in any way against Russia. This, too, was contradictory, as pledges to protect for-
merly communist countries were obviously viewed in Central and Eastern European capi-
tals as insurance against a potentially revanchist Russia. Sakwa terms this rivalry between
Russia and the West a fundamental conflict between “norms and spatiality” (Sakwa, 2016,
pp. 87–88). As such, it is difficult to imagine normal diplomatic attempts to diffuse tensions
as being sufficient to repair the chasm that has now opened along Europe’s peninsular
perimeter stretching from St. Petersburg to Rostov-on-Don, as the problem is structural
in nature.
Seen against this background, it is no surprise that every American presidential admin-
istration in the post-Cold War period has begun with attempts to reset its relationship with
Russia, only to see these efforts frustrated by what appear to be fundamentally incompa-
tible worldviews (Stent, 2014). The situation has only been worsened by the sense of
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betrayal in Moscow, the product of the sheer speed and scope of the pendulum’s right-
ward swing in Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain at a moment when Russia’s norma-
tive dependence on the West was increasing, following the collapse of the Iron Curtain and
Russia’s attempt to “return to Europe”. Further evidence of the structural nature of the
dilemma has been provided by Timofeev (2018), who claims that the negotiated stability
on the European continent, embodied in the Helsinki order, had collapsed along with the
Soviet Union: A balance of power was replaced with an imbalance of power, and strong
states were replaced with quasi-failed ones in the post-Soviet space and no longer fully
sovereign ones in the EU after Maastricht. It is impossible to envisage the creation of a
stable security order in Europe so long as the continent’s militarily most powerful
country – Russia – remains excluded from its most important institutions.
One or both sides of the Russia-West divide will need to revise their ordering principles
and norms for the impasse to be broken, and even this is no guarantee of success. The
chances of this happening are not high, at least over the medium term. The EU remains
itself seemingly trapped in a liminal condition between supranationalism and sovereignty
for its member states, and this is likely to remain the case as long as populists remain
strong political forces on the continent. In this context, the sanctions that Brussels has
imposed on Russia represent one of the few signs of continental unity and will thus
prove difficult to lift (Kortunov, 2018). The EU remains a rules-based order, and as it
believes that Moscow is responsible for breaking the rules by undermining Ukraine’s
sovereignty, it is unlikely to change course. Russia, for its part, is still emerging from its
extremely tumultuous and disorienting twentieth century, clinging to the principles and
norms it knows best, perhaps even as a form of ontological security and national unity.
Barring a significant overture from the West, it is difficult to imagine Moscow’s disposition
changing, as Russia appears to have weathered the worst of the economic sanctions and
thus has little incentive to compromise on what it considers to be a core national security
interest. On top of this, many among Russia’s political elite believe it is impossible to make
a deal with the US or EU after leading Western states reneged on their pledge to allow
Yanukovych to remain in power in Ukraine so long as early elections were held.
Over the longer term, it is possible that the EU will develop into more of a coalition of
the willing, with sets of member states pursuing different tracks of integration. The EEU, for
its part, is also a coalition of the willing of sorts, with only a select few states in the post-
Soviet space participating. This could be the basis for the eventual development of a more
flexible European order. Indeed, as mentioned above, Moscow has been at pains to stress
that the “Greater Eurasian” order remains open to EU participation, although this could be
the result of one or several different factors, ranging from Russia’s continued normative
dependence on Europe, to the requirements for its economic modernization, to the stra-
tegic realities related to its proximity to the European peninsula, to its desire not to be
entirely dependent upon China.
As it is difficult to see any substantial change in US-Russia and EU-Russia relations over
the medium term due to structural reasons, Moscow will remain dependent on Beijing for
the time being. Yet the Russia–China relationship rests on mixed foundations. On the one
hand, their rapprochement is the result of genuine normative convergence, partially in
response to Western actions. This suggests that their relationship is more substantive
than a mere “axis of convenience”, as previously suggested by Lo (2008). This situation
is likely to endure so long as both countries continue to view the United States and the
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broader West as a greater security threat than each other. Indeed, it is remarkable that the
Sino-Russian partnership has survived a power transition between the two countries
despite deep mutual historical suspicion (Deng, 2008, p. 153).
That said, Russia’s apprehension at becoming China’s junior partner is real, and it fears
being reduced to a second-tier power in its own backyard (if it hasn’t already become one).
Beijing has thus far been careful to limit its aims in regions such as Central Asia, restricting
them mostly to the economic sphere and keeping those in the security sphere tightly
focused on issues specific to Chinese security such as cross-border counterterrorism and
fighting the drug trade (Stronski & Ng, 2018). The approach taken by the different
major powers in their respective shared neighbourhoods with Russia is telling. Unlike
Washington and Brussels, who argue that Ukraine’s foreign policy orientation is none of
Russia’s business, Beijing has not challenged the legitimacy of Russia’s presence in
Central Asia. The more China is able to prove its bona fides as a responsible, conservative
and measured rising power, and the more it builds confidence with Moscow by keeping
the Sino-Eurasian order focused on a clear (but not inflexible) set of agreed-upon prin-
ciples, the more likely we are to witness the long-term stabilization of the Sino-Russian
relationship. This set of agreed-upon principles could be further buttressed depending
on the evolutionary course that Russia takes over the coming decades: If it can transform
itself from a fallen and subaltern power focused primarily on preserving its European
sphere of influence into an independent and dynamic entity firmly and confidently situ-
ated at the northern end of Eurasia (Trenin, 2018a), the prospects for a more fully-
fledged shared worldview between Russia and China will increase.
Conclusion
Despite their increasing breadth and maturity over the course of the post-Cold War period,
it still appears as if Sino-Russian normative relations today remain largely dependent on a
negative rather than a positive agenda, rooted in opposition to American hegemony
rather than substantive content. Even fledgling attempts to order Eurasia, such as the
SCO, still reference anti-hegemonial principles. For now, Russia feels as though it has
earned China’s respect as an equal partner, something it has failed to achieve in its
relationship with the West. Whether Moscow truly trusts Beijing, however, remains an
open question. Future research could focus on comparing the cultural, economic and pol-
itical norms held respectively by Russia and China, and whether there is sufficient overlap
to suggest that a thicker international society could emerge featuring these two Eurasian
giants – one rooted in shared values in a fashion similar to the transatlantic community, in
contrast with the somewhat regulatory and technical relationship that characterizes their
pledge to coordinate the EEU with the BRI.
Over the medium term, while the Sino-Russian alignment may have stabilized the inter-
national system from a neorealist perspective, there now exist several flashpoints where
the Russian and Western spheres of influence meet: in the Baltics, Ukraine, the Middle
East and Northeast Asia. Russia’s current liminal position – situated ontologically and pol-
itically in both the West and the East but securely in neither of the two – remains a source
of international instability, or at the very least uncertainty. Over the long term, though, it
would represent remarkable historical symmetry if Russia’s relationship with China sur-
passes the importance of its relationship with Europe and the broader West. After five
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centuries of the dominance of naval power and exploration, with Russia focused on both
fending off and emulating European states, the Eurasian Heartland may now be taking
centre-stage in international politics, with Russia’s primary focus shifted eastward for
the first time since the years that followed the dissolution of the Mongol yoke. In the
meantime, Moscow and Western capitals would do well to show restraint, to ensure
that the tensions caused by the rapid post-Cold War swing of the pendulum in the
Euro-Atlantic theatre are brought under at least a modicum of control and that normative
and regulatory competition between them does not dramatically escalate. We are already
beginning to see a degree of this from Brussels, which has recently agreed to a more
limited form of cooperation with Yerevan than the more far-reaching Association Agree-
ment it had previously negotiated with Kyiv (Devyatkov, 2018).
Finally, while Reus-Smit and Dunne’s recent edited volume on the “globalization of
international society” (i.e. that it emerged historically from several intermingling sources
across the globe) has provided an important contribution to the English School canon,
the case of modern Russia – colonizing itself on behalf of Europe, as Morozov puts it –
lends at least a degree of credence to Bull and Watson’s famous “expansion of inter-
national society” narrative (i.e. that it originated in Europe and then spread to encompass
the entire globe) (Bull & Watson, 1985). An exploration of the Globalization and Expansion
accounts designed specifically to determine the degree of theoretical and historical
overlap between them, with the aim of reaching tentative conclusions for great-power
behaviour in the twenty-first century and the future of international order, appears to
be a promising avenue for practically inclined scholars with an interest in English
School concepts.
Notes
1. Several scholars have covered this topic. For example, Roy Allison (2013) shows how the U.S.
invasion of Iraq and Western recognition of Kosovo influenced Russian foreign policy doc-
trines, while Richard Sakwa (2017) analyses how Western attempts to consolidate a unipolar
order after the USSR’s collapse produced international disorder due to Moscow’s rejection of
the notion that Western leadership is synonymous with order itself.
2. It is worth emphasizing that this article’s model of multiple societies to which Russia simul-
taneously belongs does not challenge the notion that there also exists a single, overarching,
global international society.
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